Security | Threat Detection | Cyberattacks | DevSecOps | Compliance

Following the July 3, 2021 news of a ransomware attack targeting Kaseya, a US-based software developer that supplies managed service providers (MSP), more information about the incident, including additional indicators of compromise (IOC) have now been shared. Reportedly the "biggest ransomware attack on record" according to some, initial reports suggested that Kaseya themselves were compromised and their network management software, VSA, was compromised to deploy a ransomware threat to their customers.

IndigoZebra is a Chinese state-sponsored actor mentioned for the first time by Kaspersky in its APT Trends report Q2 2017, targeting, at the time of its discovery, former Soviet Republics with multiple malware strains including Meterpreter, Poison Ivy, xDown, and a previously unknown backdoor called “xCaon.” Now, security researchers from Check Point have discovered a new campaign by Indigo Zebra, targeting the Afghan National Security Council via a new version of the xCaon backdoor, dubbed

On July 3, 2021, Kaseya reported1 a potential attack against its Virtual System/Server Administrator (VSA) that apparently had been limited to a small number of on-premises customers. Kaseya recommended an immediate shutdown of the VSA server until further notice. The small number of affected customers grew to thousands in just a few hours.

On the afternoon of July 2, 2021, Kaseya reported that it had been impacted by a ransomware attack affecting its Virtual System Administrator (VSA) product and advised users to shut down VSA servers immediately. Initial reporting indicates this was a well-orchestrated supply chain attack impacting about 60 managed services providers (MSPs) and up to 1,500 client organizations by leveraging a zero-day vulnerability (CVE-2021-30116).

On, July 2nd, a massive ransomware attack was launched against roughly 60 managed services providers (MSPs) by criminals associated with the REvil ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) group. The attack leveraged the on-premises servers deployed by IT Management Software vendor Kaseya. It was initially thought that Kaseya might have been compromised themselves as a root cause -- similar to the compromises associated with SolarWinds software in December of 2020.

The REvil ransomware (a.k.a Sodinokibi) is a threat group that operates in the RaaS (Ransomware-as-a-Service) model, where the infrastructure and the malware are supplied to affiliates, who use the malware to infect target organizations. On July 2, the REvil threat group launched a supply chain ransomware attack using an exploit in Kaseya’s VSA remote management software. REvil claims to have infected more than one million individual devices around the world.

Lethal unauthorized code injections like XXS (cross site scripting) attacks are some of the most dynamic cyber-attacks. They are often very difficult to detect and can result in credit card theft, fraud, and endpoint data breaches, having a huge impact on small to medium sized businesses. In a recent AT&T cybersecurity survey, 88% of respondents reported that they had experienced at least one security incident within the past year.

Throughout July and August, Kaseya released a slew of patches for this vulnerability. Bitdefender released a universal decryption key that they developed by working with law enforcement. That key, with instructions, is available to organizations that have been impacted by the attack. Although REvil popped back online after nearly two months of silence, this vulnerability is no longer a threat due to vendor patches and a widely available decryption key.

In the world of cybersecurity, there are no holidays and days off as proven by the ransomware attacks that began during the Fourth of July weekend, impacting users of the Kaseya VSA remote management and monitoring software.

When Splunk told me we would have a “breach holiday” theme for the summer, I didn’t think it would be quite so on the nose… For those of you who have been working on this Kaseya REvil Ransomware incident over the weekend, I salute you. We’ve been doing the same. As usual, my team here at Splunk likes to make sure that we have some actionable material before posting a blog, and this time is no different.