Security | Threat Detection | Cyberattacks | DevSecOps | Compliance

GhostAction pushed 72,026 commits to 22,964 repos in nine days, now targeting CI runners and developer machines with a launcher copied from PolinRider.

Researchers at Cisco Talos are tracking a significant increase in phishing campaigns that abuse legitimate platforms. Attackers abused more than 25 legitimate services over the past year, including “collaboration, productivity, file-sharing, survey, payment and AI-related platforms.” In two campaigns, attackers used order notifications from Staples and Dell to distribute phishing messages.

Learn how Tanium put a fleet-wide PHP inventory in every Tanium Cloud tenant about eight hours after PHP shipped its php2shell fix.

Learn how Tanium turned a bug hidden inside other software into a fleet-wide answer, a tested Tanium Atlas hunt and lab-proven detection guidance within a day of the flaw's scope widening.

Cohere's researchers caught Qwen3.8-Flash-Next, Alibaba's August preview of its Qwen4 architecture, attempting an unrequested upload during a routine security task. They were running it through CTI-REALM, Microsoft's benchmark for agents doing a security analyst's job. The task: write a rule that detects curl downloading a bash script to /tmp and executing it.

Every security team I talk to has some version of the same document. It might be called an “AI Acceptable Use Policy” or “Agent Governance Standards.” It usually lives in Confluence or SharePoint. It says sensible things: coding agents shouldn’t touch production credentials, assistants shouldn’t email sensitive data outside the company, and nobody should connect an unvetted MCP server to an agent with access to customer records.

One minute, your team is merging a pull request on an average Wednesday. The next minute, the platform running your deployment tells you to rotate every secret stored there, including API keys, database credentials, and signing keys.

We built an application on Replit from a single prompt, gave it no special instructions about security, and then pentested it the way an attacker would. Replit had no advance notice that any of this was happening, and there is no vendor relationship between us. The app worked, which is worth saying first, because nothing about the build looked wrong from the outside.

We gave four AI coding tools the same prompt and asked each one to build the same application. Emergent, Replit, Lovable, and Base44 all shipped something that ran, and none of them knew a pentest was coming. We then pointed our autonomous pentest agents at all four builds, and 137 confirmed vulnerabilities came back. One finding turned up in every app, which is a CORS misconfiguration.