Security | Threat Detection | Cyberattacks | DevSecOps | Compliance

Most organizations have become better at finding brand impersonation attacks. They can detect fake domains, identify cloned websites, report phishing pages, initiate takedowns, and warn customers when an impersonation campaign becomes visible. That work matters. But it does not answer the question that often matters most once the attack is live: Which users were exposed? Finding fake sites is only half the problem. Understanding who encountered them is where effective protection begins.

Authentication used to be a login form. Then it became IAM: identity providers, roles, federation, lifecycle. Then it became Zero Trust: no built-in trust, every request checked in context. Each step did not replace the last so much as fold it into a bigger runtime decision. The login still happens, but it is now one input to a constant, context-based check.

Credential harvesting is how attackers collect valid secrets at scale. See how it works, why developer machines are a prime target, and how to find them first.

At CrowdStrike, we conduct extensive red-team testing of agentic systems using diverse models, tools, and adversarial evaluation harnesses designed to probe for containment failures. To date, none of our offensive agents have escaped their intended sandbox boundaries.

Security teams that tighten insider threat controls usually hear about it fast, and not from attackers. Sales reps complain they cannot share a deck with a prospect. Engineers say a blocked upload cost them an afternoon. The business assumes that stopping data loss and staying productive are opposing goals, and every blanket policy that blocks first and asks questions later reinforces that assumption. They do not have to be opposing goals.