Security | Threat Detection | Cyberattacks | DevSecOps | Compliance

Two of the three layers of agentic AI security already have an owner in your organization, and the third has none. Identity falls to IAM and interaction falls to AppSec, because the controls at both layers extend products those teams already run. The behaviour layer covers what the agent does on the infrastructure once it is running, and it sits between a platform team with no security mandate and a SOC with no sense of what normal looks like for an agent. That gap is where a coerced agent works.

Identity governance cannot tell you which AI agent did something. It records which identity is allowed what. In a cluster, one service account often serves several workloads, and every pod is replaced at the next rollout. As a result, the permission record and the behavior record point at different objects. Detection and investigation need a unit of attribution. The Deployment is the right one. It stays stable across restarts and replicas and changes only when someone ships a rollout.

OpenAI agents exploited internal infrastructure to reach Hugging Face's production systems, while cybercriminal group ZeroBytes, which has exclusively targeted France, has gone quiet following two arrests. CYJAX rounds up what happened and what it means for defenders. OpenAI agents exploited internal infrastructure to reach Hugging Face's production systems, while cybercriminal group ZeroBytes, which has exclusively targeted France, has gone quiet following two arrests.

Teams evaluating whether to replace or extend an existing DLP stack often run into the same question: Is this actually a different category of tool, or just DLP with an AI feature bolted on? The two security categories overlap enough to cause real confusion in a buying cycle, and many may think that once will, by extension cover the other.

Unmanaged, long-lived keys weaken visibility, audit readiness, operational continuity, and cyber resilience, making API key management critical across non-human identities. An effective program maintains inventory and ownership, enforces least privilege and secure storage, and automates rotation, monitoring, and revocation across each key's lifecycle.

The assumption about AI systems affecting children is that the consent structure carries the difficulty. The subject cannot consent, so a parent consents instead, and the governance problem is collecting and tracking that permission. ‍ The assumption is backwards. Consent is usually the wrong lawful basis for these deployments, so the parental consent machinery is not required at all. What differs is something else entirely. ‍