Security | Threat Detection | Cyberattacks | DevSecOps | Compliance

A sales rep opened Glean—an AI-powered enterprise search platform that connects to your company's SaaS apps and lets anyone query across all of them in natural language—typed "Who are my top 10 customers?" and got a clean, formatted list pulled from Salesforce, cross-referenced with HubSpot, and confirmed against data sitting in Google Drive. They copy-pasted that list into a personal Gmail draft. No alerts fired. No policies triggered. No one noticed. This isn't a hypothetical.

Recent incidents have proven that Continuous Integration (CI) workflows are the new battleground for software supply chain attacks. Security Pitfalls in GitHub Actions workflows, such as the unsanitized use of pull request (PR) data, can allow attackers to execute malicious code during CI runs with devastating consequences.

Automation platforms sit at the center of modern infrastructure. They connect APIs, databases, CI/CD pipelines, SaaS tools, and internal systems. But when automation engines become compromised, the blast radius can be enormous. In February 2026, n8n, a widely used open-source workflow automation platform, disclosed four critical vulnerabilities that can lead to remote code execution (RCE) by authenticated users with workflow creation or editing permissions.

You’re evaluating AI workload security tools and every demo looks the same. Vendor A shows you an AI-SPM dashboard. Vendor B shows you a nearly identical AI-SPM dashboard with slightly different branding. Vendor C shows you posture findings with an “AI workload” tag that wasn’t there last quarter.

Last Tuesday, a platform security engineer at a mid-size fintech company ran a routine audit on their production Kubernetes clusters. The audit surfaced three LangChain-based agents, two vLLM inference servers, and a Model Context Protocol (MCP) tool runtime. None had been reported by the development teams. None appeared in any security inventory. All had been running for weeks. One of the agents had been making outbound API calls to a third-party data enrichment service every four minutes.

You’ve deployed five AI agents into your production Kubernetes cluster: a customer support chatbot, a fraud detection agent, a data pipeline processor, a code generation assistant, and an internal summarization bot. Your security team writes one set of guardrails and applies them uniformly. Within a week, you discover the code generation agent needs interpreter access the chatbot should never have.

ThreatSpike can now autofill your email, password, and even MFA using credentials stored in your Vault. The popup UI allows you to easily select between multiple credentials. Coming soon: Expanding the website support for autofill Automatically importing logins to the ThreatSpike Vault upon login.

In 2024, the California Attorney General established a new standard for mobile app compliance after securing a $500k settlement with Tilting Point Media, owing to misconfigured SDKs in one of their games that led to inadvertent CCPA and COPPA violations. The issue? The misconfigured SDKs silently caused sales and the share of children’s data without parental consent. And despite the company’s argument that the misconfiguration was unintentional, the AG’s response set a precedent.

If your organization serves patients in both the United States and the European Union, two regulators, HIPAA and GDPR, are already watching your website. Specifically, what happens in the seconds between a visitor landing on your page and your analytics stack doing its job. In March 2024, OCR mentioned that even unauthenticated website interactions, like a user browsing your oncology content or typing into a symptom checker, can constitute PHI if the visit is for health-related purposes.

Three million patients. That’s how many had their most sensitive health information silently siphoned from hospital systems and handed to a party that had no authorization to receive it. The year was 2022. And what would become one of the largest unauthorized disclosures of protected health information ever documented didn’t arrive through a ransomware attack, a stolen credential, or a nation-state intrusion. It came from a piece of marketing software doing exactly what it was designed to do.