Enterprise software projects increasingly depend on third-party and open source components. These components are created and maintained by individuals who are not employed by the organization developing the primary software, and who do not necessarily use the same security policies as the organization. This poses a security risk, because differences or inconsistencies between these policies can create overlooked areas of vulnerability that attackers seek to exploit.

Over the past week, the WhiteSource security team has found several instances of packages that use unusual techniques to disguise malicious intent. These techniques differ from what we have usually seen in the past, such as base64 and JS obfuscation. This time, we are seeing a malicious actor use hex encoding to hide the malicious behavior of the package.

With more than 38 percent of our customers impacted by the recently discovered Spring4 Shell zero-day vulnerability and more than 33 percent of impacted organizations having already remediated (removed) some or all their vulnerable libraries, I have been involved in many conversations over this incident.

From the factory floor to online shopping, the benefits of automation are clear: Larger quantities of products and services can be produced much faster. But automation can also be used for malicious purposes, as illustrated by the ongoing software supply chain attack targeting the NPM package repository. By automating the process of creating and publishing malicious packages, the threat actor behind this campaign has taken things to a new scale.

Overview The internet is abuzz with the disclosure of CVE-2022-22965, an RCE vulnerability in Spring, one of the most popular open-source frameworks for Java applications in use today. Known as “Spring4Shell” or “SpringShell”, the zero-day vulnerability has triggered widespread concern about the possibility of a wave of malicious attacks targeting vulnerable applications. Is this Log4j 2.0?

Many Static Application Security Testing (SAST) tools struggle with false positives. They often report that a vulnerability is present, while, in reality, it does not exist. This inaccuracy weighs down the engineering team, as they spend productive hours triaging the false alarms. By setting a benchmark of false positives — a limit, above which is unacceptable — you can establish a point of reference or standard against which to measure the efficacy of your SAST tool.