On August 4, 2022, Advanced – a major software provider for the UK’s National Health System (NHS) and other healthcare customers – suffered a ransomware attack from a group that is still unknown to the public. The attack disrupted NHS services including ambulance dispatch, appointment bookings, patient referrals and emergency prescriptions.
Vedere Labs recently developed a proof-of-concept (PoC) ransomware for IoT (R4IoT) using as an example attack scenario a hospital network containing IoT devices such as IP cameras, IT workstations and OT in the form of building automation controllers.
On August 15, the Clop ransomware group announced on their leak website the breach of South Staffordshire Water, a privately owned UK water supply company. This attack is yet another example of ransomware gangs targeting critical infrastructure expecting to receive a big payout, which is reminiscent of hundreds of previous incidents, including the well-known Colonial Pipeline and JBS attacks.
For decades, IT and operational technology/industrial control systems (OT/ICS) were seen as separate entities within organizations. In keeping with practices first defined by the Purdue Enterprise Reference Architecture, the two systems were entirely air gapped to never impact one another. While this separation kept OT networks more protected, it is no longer practical.
In any organization and in largely any industry, most network analytics are driven by IT. Healthcare providers are no exception. The insights extracted via network analytics offer serious opportunities for operational improvements and added value across departments. There are also significant ancillary benefits from a more cyber-aware and “plugged in” organizational posture — including improved information sharing, collaboration, and security.
It has been 10 years since Project Basecamp, a research project conducted by Digital Bond that investigated how critical operational technology (OT) devices and protocols were, to use the term they coined, “insecure by design.” Since then, we have seen hugely impactful real-world OT malware such as Industroyer, TRITON, Industroyer2 and INCONTROLLER abusing insecure-by-design functionality.
In our new threat briefing report, Forescout’s Vedere Labs presents the most detailed public technical analysis of Industroyer2 and INCONTROLLER (also known as PIPEDREAM), the newest examples of ICS-specific malware that were disclosed to the public almost simultaneously, on April 12 and 13. Thankfully, both Industroyer2 and INCONTROLLER were caught before causing physical disruption.
Digital transformation has ushered in interconnected networks that enable information sharing and collaboration. That’s great for efficiency and productivity, but many networks are flat, leaving organizations susceptible to cyberthreats that can move laterally, even across distributed environments, enabling hackers to exploit openings and pivot into their most valuable data.
Today marks an exciting moment in time for our customers and partners. Today, Forescout announced its intent to acquire Cysiv, a company with deep expertise in data-powered threat detection and response.
In our new threat briefing report, Forescout’s Vedere Labs leverages a list of IP addresses known to be used by Killnet hacktivists during past attacks to study their TTPs when attacking a series of honeypots we control.
