Security | Threat Detection | Cyberattacks | DevSecOps | Compliance

Certificate revocation is broken but we pretend it works

Last week, someone commented on my post about 47-day certificates: This perfectly captures our collective delusion that SSL certificate revocation works. You click a button, the certificate stops working. And why wouldn’t we believe that? Every CA has a big “Revoke Certificate” button right there in the dashboard. It must do something, right? Here’s the dirty truth: most revoked certificates keep working.

BygoneSSL and the certificate that wouldn't die

Turns out the scariest thing about SSL certificates isn’t when they expire. It’s when they don’t. I wrote about the CA/Browser fight that led to the 47-day certificate mandate. CAs crying about lost revenue, browsers flexing their root program authority, enterprises stuck in the middle. But nobody talks about the security research that started it all: BygoneSSL at DEFCON 2018. Two researchers mining Certificate Transparency logs found something surprising.

The 47-Day Certificate Ultimatum: How Browsers Broke the CA Cartel

For twenty years, Certificate Authorities ran the perfect protection racket. The CAs had a beautiful monopoly. Browsers needed them to keep users safe. Websites needed them to look legitimate. Everyone paid up, nobody asked too many questions. Then the cryptography of most certificates (SHA-1) got shattered, and the browsers realized they’d been played.

You Built Your Own Certificate Management System - It's Already Broken

You were tired of renewing all those certificates, and Certbot looked so easy. Now you have scripts thousands of lines long filled with command line incantations you have to Google every time you open it. The script is running on all the critical servers. And some of the printers. If someone looks at it the wrong way, a certificate expires.

Why We Built CertKit

SSL Certificates have always been a pain in the butt. From the magical OpenSSL incantations to generate a CSR to the various formats that each webserver requires. Remembering what hardware needs which certificates. Managing scheduled renewals and runbooks for which file goes where. Screw anything up and your site is “Not Secure”. And now Apple wants us to do it every 47 days. Remember when we had HTTP-only websites? Or when certificates lasted three years? Then one?