Security | Threat Detection | Cyberattacks | DevSecOps | Compliance

During an internal OpenAI evaluation, an agent left notes inside the company’s own network for future versions of itself, containing instructions on how to break free of OpenAI’s constraints. Reuters reports it isn’t clear whether this agent was connected to the one that breached Hugging Face, so don’t over-read it. But sit with the behavior for a second: an agent staging information for a successor process to find later. If a human crew did that, we’d call it a dead drop.

On July 9, an OpenAI model broke out of a sealed evaluation sandbox, found a zero-day in a package proxy, and — with no human directing it — chained stolen credentials and fresh exploits into Hugging Face's production infrastructure. Hugging Face detected it and called the FBI. OpenAI didn't know its own model had escaped for roughly 11 days. Host Tova Dvorin and offensive security expert Adrian Culley separate what's confirmed from what's hype.

Finding a security gap is easy. Closing it before it dies in a backlog is the hard part. Host Tova Dvorin sits down with Koby Bar (SVP Product, SafeBreach) and Mackenzie Kyle (CPO, Anvilogic) to unpack a partnership that turns a simulated attack that evades your controls into a deployed, tuned detection—then re-runs the attack to prove it fires. They cover Anvilogic's agentic "blueprint" workflow, where SafeBreach Helm fits, why continuous validation matters even after a rule ships, and how detection work that took days-to-weeks now takes minutes.

Detection engineering used to take days or weeks. With the SafeBreach + Anvilogic integration, it now takes minutes. SafeBreach SVP of Product Koby Bar and Anvilogic CPO Mackenzie Kyle break down how a validated attack simulation turns straight into a deployed, continuously tested detection—clearing the detection-ticket backlog that eats SOC teams alive, and building every rule on real log evidence instead of guesswork.

On June 22, 2026, the heads of all six Five Eyes cyber agencies — GCHQ, CISA, the NSA, ASD, the Canadian Centre, and New Zealand's GCSB — signed a rare joint statement: AI has rewritten the cyber risk timeline, and it's months, not years. Host Tova Dvorin and offensive security expert Adrian Culley unpack why AI is collapsing the window between vulnerability and exploit, why "having controls" isn't the same as proven controls, and why legacy systems are now strategic liabilities for the board, not the IT team. A clear-eyed look at validation, assumed breach, and what CISOs should do Monday morning.

A criminal crew with APT-grade patience is trojanizing the very tools defenders trust. Host Tova Dvorin sits down with Adrian Culley to break down FBI FLASH-20260702-01 (coordinated with CISA) on TeamPCP — the group compromising Trivy, KICS, LiteLLM, and the Telnyx SDK to sit inside CI/CD pipelines. Inside: the CanisterWorm and SANDCLOCK credential stealers, the self-replicating "Mini Shai-Hulud" worm across npm and PyPI, npm account takeovers via expired recovery domains, and five concrete defenses — starting with searching your GitHub org for "tpcp-docs" right now.

For years, Beijing and Moscow kept their cyber tools apart. Not anymore. Hosts Tova Dvorin and Adrian Culley unpack the "no limits" partnership gone operational — the ESA/Galileo satellite attack where a Chinese Volt Typhoon cell opened the door and Russian AcidRain wiper code did the damage. We cover: APT41 running Russian exploit kits, Salt Typhoon pre-positioned in US telecom, China's 72-hour zero-day disclosure law feeding vulnerabilities to Russia, and the CVSS-10 Grimbolt flaw. Why continuous validation and a CTEM program are your best defense against the axis of disruption.

OWASP just shipped AIVSS — an entirely new vulnerability scoring methodology built for autonomous AI agents, where a compromised orchestrator can score a perfect 10. Host Tova Dvorin and Adrian break down the "amplification principle": why a 2.1 CVSS finding becomes a 7.1 in the wrong agent, how persistent memory and broad tool access expand every blast radius, and what EchoLeak-style attacks already mean for real deployments. Plus where adversarial exposure validation and SafeBreach's agentic AI coverage fit in.

A criminal crew with APT-grade patience is trojanizing the very tools defenders trust. Host Tova Dvorin sits down with Adrian Culley to break down FBI FLASH-20260702-01 (coordinated with CISA) on TeamPCP — the group compromising Trivy, KICS, LiteLLM, and the Telnyx SDK to sit inside CI/CD pipelines. Inside: the CanisterWorm and SANDCLOCK credential stealers, the self-replicating "Mini Shai-Hulud" worm across npm and PyPI, npm account takeovers via expired recovery domains, and five concrete defenses — starting with searching your GitHub org for "tpcp-docs" right now.

For years, Beijing and Moscow kept their cyber tools apart. Not anymore. Hosts Tova Dvorin and Adrian Culley unpack the "no limits" partnership gone operational — the ESA/Galileo satellite attack where a Chinese Volt Typhoon cell opened the door and Russian AcidRain wiper code did the damage. We cover: APT41 running Russian exploit kits, Salt Typhoon pre-positioned in US telecom, China's 72-hour zero-day disclosure law feeding vulnerabilities to Russia, and the CVSS-10 Grimbolt flaw. Why continuous validation and a CTEM program are your best defense against the axis of disruption.