The COVID-19 pandemic caused an abrupt change — a sudden and lasting shift to remote work for the majority of knowledge workers. The number of people working remotely more than doubled in the span of a few weeks. Among the many challenges that security organizations faced during this transition was a change in user behavior.
This post is the third in a series about alternatives to bastion hosts in each of the major cloud providers. The first post covered an introduction to bastion hosts, the SSH multiplexing attack, some disadvantages to managing your own bastions, and an alternative solution in GCP. The second post covered the Session Manager service provided by AWS.
In previous blogs on the Netskope NewEdge network, we’ve discussed concepts including Secure Access Service Edge (SASE) architecture and why counting data centers alone is meaningless when trying to understand cloud service coverage. Now that we’ve laid the foundation it seems like a good time to get into what’s needed in terms of architecting the actual network and the connections required.
Recently, a Fortune 500 customer asked us to migrate 5 million lines of URL policies into our cloud solution. This configuration included frequently used websites like Office.com, Linkedin.com, and Box.com as well as hundreds of other URLs and domains that were no longer reachable or registered anymore. Our first question to the customer was, “Help us understand why you would want to do that?”, in the context of migrating their entire configuration.
Attackers were quick to exploit the COVID-19 pandemic, with coronavirus-themed phishing campaigns, Trojans delivering ransomware and backdoors, and other scams. Netskope Threat Labs have been keeping a close eye on the threat landscape and tracking COVID-related campaigns throughout this unprecedented time.
Imagine you’ve protected your production Google Cloud environment from compromised credentials, using MFA and a hardware security key. However, you find that your GCP environment has been breached through the hijacking of OAuth session tokens cached by gcloud access. Tokens were exfiltrated and used to invoke API calls from another host. The tokens were refreshed by the attacker and did not require MFA. Detecting the breach via Stackdriver was confusing, slowing incident response.
Recently I participated in a webinar with Toks Oladuti (Netskope customer, and senior IT security manager at the international law firm Herbert Smith Freehills), and my colleague Neil Thacker (Netskope’s CISO EMEA). The conversation was hosted by Janet Day, a long-time technology consultant to the legal industry. During the webinar, we touched on a lot of topics and I was particularly interested to hear Toks’ stories of HSF’s journey to the cloud.
The COVID-19 pandemic caused an abrupt and dramatic shift to remote work that has lasted five months so far and is expected to continue into 2021 as companies like Google have extended their work from home policies through July 2021. In this blog, we examine how geography and industry effect who works remotely during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Did you know that the default “copy link” option in O365 personal accounts generates a public shared link with edit permissions? In this edition, we will cover how link sharing in O365 can lead to the accidental internal and public exposure of sensitive data.
Threat actors are leveraging top tier cloud apps to host phishing baits. Netskope Threat Labs has identified an ongoing O365 phishing campaign hosted in Google App Engine with the credential harvester mostly hosted in Azure App Service. This phishing campaign typically targets O365 users via phishing emails with a direct link or attachment.
